

The FutureID approach to interoperable, cross-border digital identity



Logos of FutureID Consortium members:

- Fraunhofer
- Newcastle University
- Radboud University Nijmegen
- KU LEUVEN
- infineon
- Atos
- TU Graz
- Universität Stuttgart
- DTU
- eema
- eSec
- COMARCH
- IBM
- TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT DARMSTADT
- AGETO
- SK
- ULD
- Giesecke & Devrient
- Norsk Regnesentral

Map of Europe showing the FutureID Consortium's geographical reach, with several countries highlighted in blue.

AFSecurity Seminar
17 September 2014, University of Oslo, Norway



Bud P. Bruegger, Fraunhofer IAO

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


Agenda

- Motivation
- Decentralized Identity Management Ecosystem (DIME)
- The Authentication Process
- User Control and Privacy

Social Media: a Paradigm Shift in Identity Management

Before:



- Service Providers issue/manage identity
- Users obtain/manage one identity per service

Social Media:



- Service Providers reuse 3rd Party identities
- Users reuse their existing identity for new services



Benefits:

Service Providers


Identity Management is outsourced to social media operators

	Before	Social Media
Registration	X	--
Support (lost password)	X	--
Securing Password Store	X	--
Cost per User	High	Very Low

Benefits: Users

	Before	Social Media
Register	for every Service	--
Remember Password	for every Service	--
Recover Password	often (remember many different Passwords)	rarely
Cost per Service	High	Almost Zero

“Social Identities” have a limited Domain of Application



Trusted and Secure Identities exist, but are locked into the old paradigm

Single service,
significant effort,
not worth while!

Too costly,
too small user base,
maximum one type
if really necessary




User



Service Provider


**How can trusted identities be used
with the new paradigm?**

Objective for User



Objective for Service Provider

- The targeted user base has many different existing secure token types.
 - Example: European Marketplace of Services
 - Many different national eIDs
- The cost of supporting a large number of token types must be contained.



How?: Transformer that matches any ID to any Service

most convenient
token for user



FutureID
Infrastructure


single
interface




A Centralized Infrastructure would create a Big Brother



We need Privacy Counter Measures



We need Privacy Counter Measures



A Better Design: Decentralized and User-Centric

Explicit avoidance of central
components / players

- Privacy
- Scalability / Availability
- Market oriented
- Flexible



**ecosystem with
free participation
of an open
number of
stakeholders**






Decentralized Identity Management Ecosystem -- DIME

- Service Providers use identity services to amplify their outreach to users
- Free market for identity and trust services:
 - Competition of multiple vendors
 - Vendors can adapt to their market
 - Legislation
 - Language
- Multiple trust-schemes can co-exist and be combined in SP's policy
- Only centralized component: existing Domain Name System
 - Global registry of unique names
 - Locate services from global root
- Trust Infrastructure explicitly DNS-based


The FutureID Infrastructure Overview

A Decentralized Identity Management Ecosystem -- DIME




Free participation of an open number of stakeholders


Users




Credential Issuers (CIs)




Types of Enrollment




Types of Identities




Users with Multiple Credentials



Service Providers (SPs)




Some SPs can directly consume user credentials




Credential Transformers (CTs):

Type 1: existing Identity Providers




Authentication with existing Identity Provider




- IdP transforms:
user credential
to session credential
- SP can directly consume
session credential

SP and IdP need to support the same federation dialect

Credential Transformers (CTs): Type 2: FutureID Brokers



Authentication with existing Identity Provider and one/several Brokers




- IdP transforms:
user credential
to session credential
- Broker transforms:
 - format that SP
can consume
 - less privacy exposure
 - etc.

SP and IdP need **not**
support the same
federation dialect

Within the limits of trust, any
credential can be presented to any SP.

Who Controls Authentication Process?



SP

Whom to trust:

- user credentials (CIs)
- CTs




Auth. Flow:

(within limits of trust)

- which user credential
- which CTs
- which attributes to disclose

Trust Scheme Authorities (TSA) and Trust Infrastructure



SP/User Trust Issues:


- Difficult to determine trustworthiness
- cumbersome to enumerate trusted entities

Trust Scheme Authorities:

- regulation and oversight
- certify CIs and CTs
- define groups of CIs/CTs
 - EC qualified certificates
 - STORK level 3 credentials
 - Privacy-friendly CTs


Steps of Authentication

- High-level view:
 - Authentication is done in 6 steps
- User-centric design
 - Avoids unnecessary intermediates
 - Intermediates chosen by user
 - User is in control
 - can also abort authentication



Authentication: Step 1

SP requests authentication for user



- Unauthenticated user requests resource
- SP issues a FutureID authentication request (FAR) **to user**:
 - Credentials it can directly consume
 - Trusted credentials / CTs
 - Required identity attributes

```
CredentialTransformer
name = SP
credentialConsumers
  credentialConsumer
    name = S-C
    acceptedFormat = SAML_bearer
    acceptedIssuers = [81]
    requestedAttributes
      mandatory
        alternatives
          choice
            userId.nationallyUnique.natlGov
            choice
              userId.nationallyUnique.pseudonym
            optional firstName
            optional lastName
      optional firstName
      optional lastName
CredentialTransformer
name = B1
```


```
issuer = B2
credentialConsumers
  credentialConsumer
    name = SC
    acceptedFormat = [SAML_bearer]
    acceptedIssuers = [IdP1, ..]
  credentialProducers
    credentialProducer
      name = SP
      issuedFormat=SAML_bearer
      attributeFilter = True
      attributeDerivations
        derivation
          name = pseudonymize
          from = userId.nationallyUnique.natlGov
          to = userId.nationallyUnique.pseudonym
      interfaces
        interface
          name = transf-IF
```

Authentication: Step 2

user adds own resources to FAR

- User complements FutureID authentication request:

- available credentials





```
Credential
name = eID1
issuer = gov1
format = eID.gov1.vers2
providedAttributes
  userId.nationallyUnique.nat1Gov
  firstName
  lastName
  dateOfBirth
consentedAttributes
  userId.nationallyUnique.pseudonym
  firstName
  age
```

```
Credential
name = bID1
issuer = bank1
format = bankID.bank1
providedAttributes
  userId.nationallyUnique.nat1Gov
  firstName
  lastName
  accountNumber
consentedAttributes
  userId.nationallyUnique.pseudonym
  firstName
```


Authentication: Step 3

Generation of possible Authentication Plans

- User's local or remote Authentication Solver:
 - Find possible authentication plans





Authentication: Step 4

User selects Best Authentication Plan


- User selects best authentication plan or aborts

- which credential to use
- which intermediates are trusted
- which attributes to disclose




Authentication: Step 5

Execution of Authentication Plan



■ User's local or remote Authentication Executor:


- communicates with CTs
- obtains a final session credential



Authentication: Step 6

Presentation of Session Credential

- User presents final session credential to SP.
- SP verifies and serves resource to user.





The FutureID's Approach to Privacy is Evolutionary

- Reuse of existing user-bases, investments, agreements
 - Existing eIDs/credentials
 - Existing IdPs, infrastructures (STORK)
 - Existing Services (easy for SPs to participate)
- Fixes for biggest concerns
- Ease transition to/roll-out of revolutionary approaches
 - Support of Attribute Based Credentials (privacy ABCs)
 - ABC4Trust
 - IBM's Identity Mixer (Idemix)
 - Microsoft's uProve
 - IRMA (smart card implementation of idemix algorithms)



Concerns with Government eIDs

- Unique Identifier
- Excessive disclosure of attributes
- FutureID Broker:
 - Derivation of sector- or service-specific pseudonyms
 - Filtering of attributes
 - Derivation of attributes:
 - Nationality -> EU-citizen
 - Date of Birth -> 18 or older




Federated Identity Management lacks User Control

■ SP determines Intermediaries

- Users unaware of who processes personal data
- No possibility to intervene (incl. abort)

■ SP determines which user attributes are disclosed


- direct query from SP to IdP (e.g., SAML artifact resolution profile)



■ FutureID: Solver provides control:


(possibly automated via user policy):

- Awareness who processes which data
- Selection of intermediaries (within limits of SP's trust)
- Control over disclosed data
- Possibility to abort (before disclosing identity data)




Big Brother: Collection of “meta data”

- WHO accesses WHAT, when
 - WHO: Unique identifier, browser fingerprint, cookie
- Profiling individuals
 - Link activities of given individual
- FutureID architecture:
 - Decentralize (many intermediaries)
 - User chooses trusted intermediary, arbitrary number of intermediaries
 - Direct presentation of credential without intermediary
 - Privacy ABCs
 - Do not track pattern



Do Not Track Pattern

(Ronny Bjones, Microsoft)




- Broker 1 cannot see SP
- Broker 2 cannot see IdP
- Connection through user component (FutureID executor)


This pattern stops big brothers

FutureID Support of “revolutionary” Privacy ABCs

- Bootstrap privacy friendly credentials with gov. eIDs
 - Gov. eIDs: secure enrollment
 - Even if pseudonyms:
 - It is a person
 - A person has only one pseudonym in a given domain
- Present credential without need for intermediary



- ABC-enable legacy SPs





Conclusions

- The FutureID architecture is mostly economically motivated:
 - Open market of identity and trust services
 - Business models that make it economically sustainable
 - Maximize user acceptance
- FutureID has an evolutionary approach to privacy
- Privacy-unfriendly authentication is anyhow possible (if user consents)
- FutureID adds privacy-enhancement over status quo
 - User centric: awareness, consent, choices (intermediaries, disclosure)
 - Possibility to filter, derived attributes, pseudonyms
 - Possibility to avoid big brothers
- FutureID supports a smooth transition to “revolutionary” privacy solutions (ABCs)

Example of Possible Authentication Plans

Visualization from a prototype implementation

