


Cryptography for People

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


1000101101010100100100100110010010010
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







How can we bridge the digital gap?

- Passwords?
- Biometrics?
- Watch?
- Implanted Chip?




- Username & password most prominent form of user authentication
- Lots of data breaches resulting in passwords being compromised
- Password are **not** insecure – we used them wrongly today!



- Passwords are symmetric and get lost too often
- Password (hashes) useless against offline attacks
 - Human-memorizable passwords are inherently weak
 - NIST: 16-character passwords have 30 bits of entropy \approx 1 billion possibilities
 - Rig of 25 GPUs tests 350 billion possibilities / second, so \approx 3ms for 16 chars
 - 60% of LinkedIn passwords cracked within 24h
- More expensive hash functions provide very little help only
 - increases verification time as well
 - does not work for short passwords such as pins etc
- Single-server solutions inherently vulnerable to offline attacks
 - Server / administrator / hacker can always guess & test

Basic idea: multi-server password verification protocols

- split password for verification
- no server alone can test password
- no piece of information depends on password





→ Off-line attacks no longer possible!

→ On-line attacks detectable and handleable (throttling)

2PASS – Password-authenticated secret sharing


- also secret share a cryptographic key $K = K_1 \cdot K_2$





We can also do cryptographic operations, e.g., signing

- User with device: device can be one of the password checking servers
- Device & user authenticate towards server: two factor authentication
- After authentication, device and server run distributed signing protocol



- Security equivalent to real smart card
 - (-) Hard to protect against malware on device (smart card fares better here)
 - (+) Virtual smart card can be revoked if lost.
- Virtual smart cards much more convenient (roll out, different devices, ...)


So are we happy?

... we know how we can protect our data :-)

... but only as long as it's under our control :-)

→ How can we use the Internet with our data being protected?

Houston, we
have a problem!



Houston, we
have a problem!




“Neil Armstrong's footprints are still up
there”



- Data storage ever cheaper → “store by default”
 - e.g., surveillance cameras, Google Street View with wireless traffic, Apple location history,...
- Data mining ever better
 - self-training algorithms cleverer than their designers
 - not just trend detection, even prediction, e.g., flu pandemics, ad clicks, purchases,...
 - what about health insurance, criminal behavior?
 - correlation with illegal criteria, e.g., race, religion
 - spying and sabotage by intelligence agencies

The ways of data are hard to understand

- Devices, operating systems, & apps are getting more complex and intertwined
 - Mashups, Ad networks
 - Not visible to users, and experts
 - Data processing changes constantly
- Networks and systems badly protected
 - Systems are being built with “paper world” in mind
 - Feature creep, security comes last, if at all
 - Everyone can do apps and sell them



→ It is far too easy to lose data and to collect data

- Huge security problem!

- Millions of hacked passwords (100'000 followers \$115 - 2013)
- Lost credit card numbers (\$5 - 2013)
- Stolen identities (\$150 - 2005, \$15 - 2009, \$5 – 2013)
- Lots of not reported issues (industrial espionage, etc)



- Difficult to put figures down

- Credit card fraud
- Spam & marketing
- Manipulating stock ratings, etc..



- We know secret services can do it easily, but they are not the only ones

- but this is not about homeland security
- and there are limits to the degree of protection that one can achieve



- ... and we have not even discussed social issues such as democracy etc

- last but not least: data are the new money, so they need to be protected!


Privacy by design

- Communication layer
 - TOR, JAP, etc
- Authentication layer
 - privacy-preserving attribute-based credentials
- Application layer
 - eVoting, ePolls,
 - all apps should be done as “privacy by design”

The background of the slide is a photograph of a beach. In the upper half, waves are breaking onto the shore, with white foam visible. The sand is a light, textured grey. In the lower half, there is a single, dark, well-defined footprint in the sand, pointing towards the bottom right. The text is overlaid on the middle of the image.

Privacy at the Authentication Layer


Authentication without identification



- ID:
 - (dynamic) set of attributes shared w/ someone
 - different with different entities
- ID Management: two things to make identities useful
 - authentication means: **strong e-authentication**
 - means to transport attributes between parties: **certified attributes**

A photograph of a wooden crate, possibly a shipping container, lying on its side on a rough, rocky, and uneven ground. The crate is made of light-colored wood and has several horizontal slats. It is positioned in the center-left of the frame. The background is a dense field of rocks and pebbles of various sizes, creating a textured, greyish-brown surface. The lighting is bright, casting a distinct shadow of the crate onto the ground to its right.


Let's see a scenario






Alice

You need:
- subscription
- be older than 12




Movie Streaming Service

Using digital equivalent of paper world, e.g., with X.509 Certificates




...with X.509 Certificates




This is a privacy and security problem!


- identity theft
- profiling
- discrimination




With OpenID and similar solution, e.g.,
log-in with Facebook



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log-in with Facebook



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log-in with Facebook



Identity Mixer (Privacy ABCs) solve this.

When Alice authenticates to the Movie Streaming Service with Identity Mixer, all the services learns is that Alice


has a subscription

is older than 12

and no more!

Like PKI, but better:


- One secret Identity (secret key)
- Many Public Pseudonyms (public keys)




Concepts: Key binding & Pseudonyms


Like PKI, but better:


- Issuing a credential




Concept: credentials










Concept: presentation policy

Like PKI


- but does not send credential
- only minimal disclosure




Concept: presentations token

Like PKI

- but does not send credential
- only minimal disclosure



An Software Stack View on Identity Mixer



```
<abc:PresentationPolicy PolicyUID="https://movies...com/presentationpolicies/movie1">
```

```
<abc:Message>
```

```
<abc:ApplicationData> Terms and Conditions </abc:ApplicationData>
```

```
</abc:Message>
```

```
<abc:Credential Alias="#voucher">
```

```
<abc:CredentialSpecAlternatives>
```

```
<abc:CredentialSpecUID>https://movies.....com/specifications/voucher</abc:CredentialSpecUID>
```

```
</abc:CredentialSpecAlternatives>
```

```
<abc:IssuerAlternatives>
```

```
<abc:IssuerParametersUID>https://movies....com/parameters/voucher</abc:IssuerParametersUID>
```

```
</abc:IssuerAlternatives>
```

```
</abc:Credential>
```


```
<abc:AttributePredicate Function="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:dateTime-geq">
```


```
<abc:Attribute CredentialAlias="#voucher" AttributeType="Expires" />
```

```
<abc:ConstantValue>2014-06-17T14:06:00Z</abc:ConstantValue>
```

```
</abc:AttributePredicate>
```

```
</abc:PresentationPolicy>
```





idemixdemo.zurich.ibm.com
idemixdemo.mybluemix.net

- Idemix available for use
 - pilots done
 - code at github, also in IBM Bluemix as a service late spring
- Using IT *securely* still hard
 - Much of the technology exists, needs to get used and made usable
- Roadmap
 - Explain possibilities to engineers, policy makers, and end-user
 - Laws with teeth (encourage investment in privacy)
- Challenges
 - Internet services get paid with personal data (inverse incentive)
 - End users are not able to handle their data (user interfaces..)
 - Security technology typically invisible and hard to sell
- Towards a secure information society
 - Society changes quickly and gets shaped by technology
 - Consequences are hard to grasp yet (time will show...)
 - We must inform and engage in a dialog

Thank you!

- eMail: identity@zurich.ibm.com
- Links:
 - www.abc4trust.eu
 - www.futureID.eu
 - www.au2eu.eu
 - www.PrimeLife.eu
 - www.zurich.ibm.com/idemix
 - idemixdemo.zurich.ibm.com
- Code
 - github.com/p2abcengine & abc4trust.eu/idemix