


Egil Aspevik Martinsen

Polymorphic Viruses

Material from Master Thesis
«Detection of Junk Instructions in Malicious
Software»

History



Two Quotes

«*The most significant change has been the evolution of virus writing hobbyists into criminally operated gangs bent on financial gain*»


Mikko Hypponen, F-Secure, 2006,
(http://www.f-secure.com/news/items/news_2006011900.shtml)

«*Last year was the first year that proceeds from cybercrime were greater than proceeds from the sales of illegal drugs, and that was, I believe, over \$105 billion*»

Valerie McNiven, US Treasury, 2006


(«*Dirty money on the wires: the business models of cyber criminals*». Virus Bulletin Conference, 2006)

One «Protection Money» Scheme




Polymorfism – «many forms»

Regular viruses




Polymorphic viruses



Case study: Zmist

- Zmist is a virus employing many polymorphic techniques
- Zmist is the only virus known to utilize the code integration technique
- Of the leading 14 antivirus products tested, 7 failed to detect 100% of Zmist samples

(AV-comparatives.org, February 2008 On-demand comparative)



Decryptor 1 (D1)

```
call  [0x4082FE]
mov   [0x41B000], ecx
bsf   ecx, eax
and   ecx, 0x9ACEDD96
mov   [0x41BE98], ebx
mov   ecx, esi
btr   ecx, ecx
mov   ecx, 0x5543994C
mov   ebx, 0x00426758
imul  ecx, edx, 0xA461EDD1
movsx  ecx, ax
mov   [ebx], esi
test  al, 0xBA
test  edi, esi
imul  ecx, esi
mov   esi, 0x00000000
bswap ebx
mov   [0x424C70], esi
mov   ebx, edi
add   ch, bl
mov   esi, 0x0040A7E1
mov   ecx, [esi]
mov   ebx, ecx
shld  esi, ecx, cl
mov   esi, 0x00423E40
dec   cl
inc   ecx
mov   ecx, esi
push  ebx
```

Decryptor 2 (D2)

```
call  0x00003090
push  eax
pop   [0x415E64]
mov   al, 0x4B
xadd  eax, eax
adc   eax, 0x01D257DA
push  esi
neg   eax
imul  esi, ecx, 0xCD32F179
jmp   0x000030AF
mov   eax, 0x004167FC
not   esi
lea    esi, [-0x5EA21BF8]
mov   esi, esi
bsr   esi, ecx
push  ecx
test  esi, eax
pop   [eax]
mov   esi, 0x60C25CE0
bswap esi
mov   esi, ebx
movsx esi, bp
xadd  esi, esi
adc   esi, 0x52ED71CC
jmp   0x000030E0
test  ebx, ecx
mov   ah, 0xF9
mov   esi, 0xFCA091F5
imul  eax, esi, 0x45285F96
```

Decryptor 3 (D3)

```
mov   [0x421634], edi
mov   [0x41FBFC], ebx
mov   edi, 0x00421D90
push  eax
pop   [edi]
mov   [0x41FBF0], 0x00000000
mov   edi, 0x004143E2
push  edi
pop   eax
mov   ebx, [eax]
mov   [0x4211B8], ebx
mov   edi, [0x4035E5]
mov   ebx, edi
mov   [0x41FBF8], ebx
mov   edi, 0x0041FBF0
push  [edi]
pop   eax
mov   ebx, eax
push  ebx
pop   eax
mov   edi, 0x00421630
push  eax
pop   [edi]
mov   eax, 0x00421630
mov   ebx, [eax]
add   ebx, [0x4062A8]
mov   [0x421630], ebx
mov   edi, [0x421630]
mov   ebx, [edi]
```

Polymorphic Techniques

- Arbitrary placement of code and data
- Register renaming
- Change of code flow
- Junk instructions
- Semantically equivalent instructions

Decryptor 1 (D1)

```
call  [0x4082FE]
mov   [0x41B000], ecx
bsf   ecx, eax
and   ecx, 0x9ACEDD96
mov   [0x41BE98], ebx
mov   ecx, esi
btr   ecx, ecx
mov   ecx, 0x5543994C
mov   ebx, 0x00426758
imul  ecx, edx, 0xA461EDD1
movsx  ecx, ax
mov   [ebx], esi
test  al, 0xBA
test  edi, esi
imul  ecx, esi
mov   esi, 0x00000000
bswap ebx
mov   [0x424C70], esi
mov   ebx, edi
add   ch, bl
mov   esi, 0x0040A7E1
mov   ecx, [esi]
mov   ebx, ecx
shld  esi, ecx, cl
mov   esi, 0x00423E40
dec   cl
inc   ecx
mov   ecx, esi
push  ebx
```


Decryptor 2 (D2)

```
call  0x00003090
push  eax
pop   [0x415E64]
mov   al, 0x4B
xadd  eax, eax
adc   eax, 0x01D257DA
push  esi
neg   eax
imul  esi, ecx, 0xCD32F179
jmp   0x000030AF
mov   eax, 0x004167FC
not   esi
lea   esi, [-0x5EA21BF8]
mov   esi, esi
bsr   esi, ecx
push  ecx
test  esi, eax
pop   [eax]
mov   esi, 0x60C25CE0
bswap esi
mov   esi, ebx
movsx esi, bp
xadd  esi, esi
adc   esi, 0x52ED71CC
jmp   0x000030E0
test  ebx, ecx
mov   ah, 0xF9
mov   esi, 0xFCA091F5
imul  eax, esi, 0x45285F96
```

Decryptor 3 (D3)

```
mov   [0x421634], edi
mov   [0x41FBFC], ebx
mov   edi, 0x00421D90
push  eax
pop   [edi]
mov   [0x41FBF0], 0x00000000
mov   edi, 0x004143E2
push  edi
pop   eax
mov   ebx, [eax]
mov   [0x4211B8], ebx
mov   edi, [0x4035E5]
mov   ebx, edi
mov   [0x41FBF8], ebx
mov   edi, 0x0041FBF0
push  [edi]
pop   eax
mov   ebx, eax
push  ebx
pop   eax
mov   edi, 0x00421630
push  eax
pop   [edi]
mov   eax, 0x00421630
mov   ebx, [eax]
add   ebx, [0x4062A8]
mov   [0x421630], ebx
mov   edi, [0x421630]
mov   ebx, [edi]
```

Junk Instruction Detection (JID)



«*In fact, while reverse engineering, you can spend up to 80% of your time reading the values in registers and deducing what the code will do or is doing as a result of these values»*

Konstantin Rozinov, Bell Labs, (rozinov.sfs.poly.edu/papers/bagle_analysis_v.1.0.pdf)

Decryptor 1 (D1)

```
call  [0x4082FE]
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bsf   ecx, eax
and   ecx, 0x9ACEDD96
mov   [0x41BE98], ebx
mov   ecx, esi
btr   ecx, ecx
mov   ecx, 0x5543994C
mov   ebx, 0x00426758
imul  ecx, edx, 0xA461EDD1
movsx  ecx, ax
mov   [ebx], esi
test  al, 0xBA
test  edi, esi
imul  ecx, esi
mov   esi, 0x00000000
bswap ebx
mov   [0x424C70], esi
mov   ebx, edi
add   ch, bl
mov   esi, 0x0040A7E1
mov   ecx, [esi]
mov   ebx, ecx
shld  esi, ecx, cl
mov   esi, 0x00423E40
dec   cl
inc   ecx
mov   ecx, esi
push  ebx
```

Decryptor 2 (D2)

```
call  0x00003090
push  eax
pop   [0x415E64]
mov   al, 0x4B
xadd  eax, eax
adc   eax, 0x01D257DA
push  esi
neg   eax
imul  esi, ecx, 0xCD32F179
jmp   0x000030AF
mov   eax, 0x004167FC
not   esi
lea    esi, [-0x5EA21BF8]
mov   esi, esi
bsr   esi, ecx
push  ecx
test  esi, eax
pop   [eax]
mov   esi, 0x60C25CE0
bswap esi
mov   esi, ebx
movsx esi, bp
xadd  esi, esi
adc   esi, 0x52ED71CC
jmp   0x000030E0
test  ebx, ecx
mov   ah, 0xF9
mov   esi, 0xFCA091F5
imul  eax, esi, 0x45285F96
```

Decryptor 3 (D3)

```
mov   [0x421634], edi
mov   [0x41FBFC], ebx
mov   edi, 0x00421D90
push  eax
pop   [edi]
mov   [0x41FBF0], 0x00000000
mov   edi, 0x004143E2
push  edi
pop   eax
mov   ebx, [eax]
mov   [0x4211B8], ebx
mov   edi, [0x4035E5]
mov   ebx, edi
mov   [0x41FBF8], ebx
mov   edi, 0x0041FBF0
push  [edi]
pop   eax
mov   ebx, eax
push  ebx
pop   eax
mov   edi, 0x00421630
push  eax
pop   [edi]
mov   eax, 0x00421630
mov   ebx, [eax]
add   ebx, [0x4062A8]
mov   [0x421630], ebx
mov   edi, [0x421630]
mov   ebx, [edi]
```

Decryptor 1 (D1)

```
call  [0x4082FE]
mov   [0x41B000], ecx
mov   [0x41BE98], ebx
mov   ebx, 0x00426758
mov   [ebx], esi
mov   esi, 0x00000000
mov   [0x424C70], esi
mov   esi, 0x0040A7E1
mov   ecx, [esi]
mov   ebx, ecx
mov   esi, 0x00423E40
mov   ecx, esi
push  ebx
pop   [ecx]
mov   esi, 0x00416723
mov   ebx, [esi]
push  ebx
pop   ecx
push  ecx
pop   [0x424C6C]
mov   esi, 0x00424C70
mov   ebx, [esi]
mov   ecx, ebx
mov   esi, 0x0041B004
push  ecx
pop   [esi]
push  [0x41B004]
pop   ebx
mov   esi, 0x00416559
```

Decryptor 2 (D2)

```
call  0x00003090
push  eax
pop   [0x415E64]
push  esi
jmp   0x000030AF
mov   eax, 0x004167FC
push  ecx
pop   [eax]
jmp   0x000030E0
mov   esi, 0xFCA091F5
sub   esi, 0x2154A1C0
sub   esi, 0xACEEC496
xor   esi, 0x2E5D2B9F
mov   [0x417CF0], esi
push  [0x402A32]
pop   esi
mov   ecx, esi
push  ecx
pop   [0x415E6C]
jmp   0x00003174
push  [0x40A9AB]
jmp   0x00003180
pop   eax
push  eax
pop   [0x415E60]
mov   eax, 0x00417CF0
mov   ecx, [eax]
push  ecx
pop   esi
```

Decryptor 3 (D3)

```
mov   [0x421634], edi
mov   [0x41FBFC], ebx
mov   edi, 0x00421D90
push  eax
pop   [edi]
mov   [0x41FBF0], 0x00000000
mov   edi, 0x004143E2
push  edi
pop   eax
mov   ebx, [eax]
mov   [0x4211B8], ebx
mov   edi, [0x4035E5]
mov   ebx, edi
mov   [0x41FBF8], ebx
mov   edi, 0x0041FBF0
push  [edi]
pop   eax
mov   ebx, eax
push  ebx
pop   eax
mov   edi, 0x00421630
push  eax
pop   [edi]
mov   eax, 0x00421630
mov   ebx, [eax]
add   ebx, [0x4062A8]
mov   [0x421630], ebx
mov   edi, [0x421630]
mov   ebx, [edi]
```

Polymorphism Today

- Serverside polymorphism
 - Pre-mutated
 - Payload only
 - High language polymorphism, not assembler
- Packers
 - Work like Zmist decryptor.
 - Used in clean code to avoid «software cracking»
 - Used in virus code, 3-4 different packers applied