

Privacy Principles and Requirements

Bakgrunn, prinsipper og krav

PETs - Privacy Enhancing Technology

Hvordan ivareta sikkerheten for personinformasjon på nettsteder?

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Innhold

- Bakgrunn POL (Loven ...)
- Brukerkompetanse og beskyttelse
 - Brukerundersøkelse
 - En hypotese
- Personvernsprinsipper
- Personvernskrav til systemer
- PETweb metoder
- Verktøy
 - Privacy Impact Analysis
- Oppsummering



Privacy & Security in the news ...





Personopplysningsloven (POL)

- Formål og spesifikasjon
 - ... beskytte den enkelte mot at personvernet blir krenket gjennom behandling av personopplysninger.
 - Personvernsopplysninger: opplysninger og vurderinger som kan knyttes til en enkelt person
 - Samtykke: en frivillig, uttrykkelig og informert erklæring
 ...
- Dette er en god og viktig lov ettersom det blir
 - stadig mer informasjon lagret om borgerne
 - stadig mer automatisk behandling basert på personopplysninger
- Tillit til behandlingsansvarlige er (overdrevent ?) stor



The PETweb project background

- Cost of storage approaches zero can save everything
- Find out what end-users actually do to handle their privacy
- Find out what systems do
 - Portal owners, System integrators, Technology providers

Goals

- Develop tools to analyse the impact of privacy violations
- Identify efficient PETs in large scale web solutions
- Use a Case Study: MinSide/MyPage – the Norwegian G2C portal
- Main partners: NR, HiG, Software Innovation, Sun, norge.no



Awareness and Protection (1)

Findings from MSc Thesis of Freddy Andreassen (Høgskolen i Gjøvik, supervised by Prof. Einar Snekkenes)


- There is a strong correlation between awareness and actual use of protective measures
- Almost everyone knows about Viruses and the need to protect against it
- ▶ ca 70 % use Firewalls and pop-up blockers
- ca 50% use anti spyware SW on average

Why is this a problem?

In the second quarter of 2006, close to x% of checked U.S. home computers contained forms of spyware.




Who uses Anti Virus (AV) SW



In total: 92.1% uses AS SW -> OK!




Who uses Firewalls (FW)



In total: 72% uses a FW -> OK!




Who uses Pop-Up Blockers



In total: 66 % uses AS SW -> fair!




Who uses Anti Spyware (AS) SW



In total: 52 % uses AS SW and 23% don't know!



Awareness and Protection (2)



In the second quarter of 2006, close to 90% of checked U.S. home computers contained forms of spyware.

Best guess

- ⇒ many get spyware without knowing about the threat
- ⇒ even more get it with Anti Spyware installed

When citizens use PCs to access SENSITIVE private information this is an issue !!



An hypothesis about End Users

Assumptions

- Users will start at the lower end of the awareness score and move upward with experience (unless they read up on current security issues BEFORE using a new service)
- ► There is a considerable time-lag from a new privacy (or security) threat appears until wide spread deployment of counter measures is in place at the User Agent

=> this is the "window of opportunity" where attack efficiency is high (and the average user is completely ignorant)

HYPOTHESIS

Customers have VERY varying security level on their Agents, AND

the flow of new threats will not end;

there will ALWAYS EXIST a large proportion of End Users that have INADEQUATE security measures

An interesting question is; can (A)SPs leave full responsibility for the risk implied by a service to the customers ???



Privacy Principles

- 1. Principles concerning the fundamental design of products and applications:
 - Data minimization (maximum anonymity and early erasure of data)
 - Transparency of processing
 - Security
- 2. Principles concerning the lawfulness of processing:
 - Legality (e.g. consent)
 - Special categories of personal data
 - Finality and purpose limitation
 - Data quality
- 3. Rights of the data subject:
 - Information requirements
 - Access, correction, erasure, blocking
 - Objection to processing
- 4. Data traffic with third countries



Privacy Principles (cont.)

- 5. Notification requirements
- Processing by a processor responsibility and control
- 7. Other specific requirements resulting from the
 - ► Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002/58/EC/,
 - Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC and
 - the Norwegian legislation.

The grouping of privacy facilitation principles of data processing have been used by the ICPP – the Data Protection Authority of Schleswig-Holstein, Germany for the purposes of conducting privacy audits, and in particular by the catalogue of requirements of the ICPP "Privacy Seal for IT Products"



Privacy Requirements

Map Principles to Requirements

1. Fundamentals

- Data minimization
 - a priori anonymous
 - data are made persistent only when explicitly required
 - data are erased when no longer needed
- Transparency of processing
 - controller keeps track of ALL processing and informs users about it
- Security
 - the systems shall be adequately secured;
 - use Best Practice,
 - consider cost of implementation
 - UPFRONT threat analysis; security measures, continuous Risk Mgmt

2. Lawfulness of processing

- Legality (e.g. consent)
 - Users must understand that they are entering into a contract
- Special categories of personal data
 - processed only when required by law
- Finality and purpose limitation
 - Users have a right to object to processing
- Data quality
 - accuracy, completeness and inspection
 - storage terms
 - periodical clearing



Methods & Tools


- Privacy Ontology
- Privacy Threat model
 - identifies PRIVACY and SECURITY threats
- System Architecture
 - identifies the ASSETS involved
- **▶** Threat Impact Analysis
 - evaluate threat IMPACT for each asset

Goal

Input data to a tool that gives different "views" of the threat model => Privacy Impact Analysis




PETweb Methods & Tools






The PETweb Architecture





Privacy Impact Analysis (1)





Privacy Impact Analysis Tool

| r i | MODERN CONTROL OF CONTROL | | - | 0 | 100000000000000000000000000000000000000 | | r - | 1 1 | - | | - | | |
|-----------|---|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|---|----------|--------|-----------|---|------------|-------|-----------|--|
| | Asset Name | 4 | Rating | | system Rating | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | End User (EU) | | 100 | 14,00 % | 14 | | | | | | | | |
| _ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| _ | | max-tas | avg-tas | sum-tas | |) | | | | 3 | | | |
| | | | N MA | ⊈r regresse | = 8 0 M V | _ | | | | | | | |
| | Threat Agent type | Y | | | Threat weighted | | | - | | | | | |
| | Hacker threats | | 5,00 | | 100 | r . | | - | | | | | |
| | Impact scores: | max | avg | sum(avg) | | | | | | | V | | |
| | | 5,00 | 4,26 | 12,79 | | | | | | | | | |
| Ц, | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Threat Description | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | This measures to what extent | a Hacker is a threat | to the User Agent a | and the informat | ion on it. | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | | | Acres of the second | | | | | | | | | | |
| _ | | Attacks originat | | er | , | | | | | | | | |
| \Box | | Social engineerin | | | | Spoofing | | | | Eavesdropp | | | |
| | result (floored to 5) | 5,00 | 4,50 | | | | 4,96 | | | | 3,33 | - 6 | |
| Ц | | max | avg | | | max | avg | | | max | avg | | |
| | - Attack Properties | | G | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Automated/manual A1 | 0,90 | 0,90 | careful! | | | 1,00 | | | | 0,80 | | |
| _[| Active/passive A2 | 1,00 | 1,00 | 0,1 - 2,0 | | 1,00 | 1,00 | 0,1 - 2,0 | | 1,00 | 1,00 | 0,1 - 2,0 | |
| | (Logical/physical) | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | 9 | | |
| J | (Internal/external) | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | 1. | | | 1 | 4 | | |
| 7 | | | | | | | | | [| | | | |
| _ | - Threat Agent Properties | | 4 2,16 | 54 | | 3,2 | 2,18 | 54,4 | | 2,8 | 1,80 | 45 | |
| | 5 272 4 | max | avg | sum | | max | avg | sum | | max | avg | sum | |
| | Intent | 4 | 2.8 | 14 | | 4 | 3 | 15 | | | 2,6 | 13 | |
| | Profit orientation | 1 | 1000 | | | 4 | | | | 3 | * | | |
| | Revenge | 4 | | | | 2 | | | | 2 | 1 | | |
| | Vandalism | 4 | | | | 4 | | | | 3 | | | |
| | Ego | 4 | | | | 2 | | | | 2 | | | |
| | Curiosity | 1 | | | | 3 | | | | 3 | Ť. | | |
| \forall | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | * | - | |
| ٦, | Capabilities | 4 | 3,2 | 16 | | 4 | 3,4 | 17 | | 4 | 3,4 | 17 | |
| | Time ressources | 3 | 0,2 | 10 | | 3 | 0,1 | 1 | | 4 | 0,1 | | |
| | Education / Knowledge | 4 | | | | 4 | | | | 4 | - | | |
| | Financial resources | 1 | | | | 3 | | | | 2 | | | |
| | Equipment | 4 | | | 1 | 3 | | | | 3 | | | |
| | Skills | 4 | | | | 4 | | 1 | | 4 | Y | | |
| ť | Ordina | 1 | | | + | | | 1 | | • | | | |
| + | Opportunity | 5 | 3.6 | 18 | 1 | 4 | 3.4 | 17 | | 4 | 3 | 15 | |
| | Target Access | 5 | 0,0 | 10 | + | 4 | 9.7 | 111 | | 4 | 9 | 14 | |
| | Target Access Target Vulnerabilities | 3 | | | | 3 | | | | 2 | | - | |
| | Target Vuinerabilities Assessed Target weakness | 3 | | | | 4 | | 1 | | 4 | - · | - | |
| | | - | - | | - | 2 | | - | | 1 | | - | |
| | Expected attack value / gain | 3 | | | | 4 | | - | | 4 | | | |
| - | Chance of not being caught | 4 | - | | - | 4 | | - | | 4 | - | | |
| 4 | | Max | 101/0 | | - | 14037 | #1/O | - | | MANA | 11/0 | | |
| 4 | 0 | MAX | AVG | | | | AVG | ļ | | | AVG | - | |
| - | Consequence/Outcome | 4, | 10 00 00 | I | | 3,5 | 1 | | | 4,5 | | | |
| _ | 0 1 0 | max | avg | | | max | avg | | | | avg | | |
| | Security Privacy | 4 | 2,25 | | | 3 | 2 | | | | 2,25 | | |
| | Interception | 1 | | | | 2 | | | | 4 | | | |
| | Manipulation | 3 | | | | 3 | | | | 2 | | | |
| | Denial of service | 4 | | | | 1 | | | | 2 | | | |
| | Repudiation | 1 | | | | 2 | | | | 1 | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | - Information Privacy | 5 | 2,375 | | | 4 | 2,5625 | | | 5 | 2,375 | | |
| | Information collection | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Surveillance | 4 | | fine | | 2 | | | | 2 | | | |
| \neg | Interrogation | 1 | | fine | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | | | |
| | Information processing | | | | | | | | | | | | |



Summary

Background

Awareness study => many users without adequate security

The Framework provides

- ► Collection of Privacy Principles & Structured Requirements
- A knowledge base that can be maintained with the
 - Privacy Ontology
 - Privacy Threat Model
- Adaption to other systems by modifying the
 - System Architecture and Assets involved
 - Privacy Impact Analysis tool
- Different views of privacy impact on assets by the
 - Threat Impact Analysis tool



... slutt

Takk for oppmerksomheten!

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